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What's Land Got to Do with It?: Rhetoric and
Indeterminacy in Land's Favored Legal
Status
NANCY PERKINS SPYKEt

Nature is an endless combination and repetition of a
very few laws. She hums the old well-known air through
innumerablevariations.
-Ralph Waldo Emerson'
INTRODUCTION

For centuries courts have told us that land is unique.
Hundreds of judicial opinions rely on this principle.2 Firstyear law students learn that land's uniqueness all but
guarantees an aggrieved buyer specific performance of a
real estate sales contract. The peculiarities of land figure
into variance and eminent domain cases as well.3 Less frequently, we are reminded of land's uniqueness in disputes
involving nuisance, class actions, partition, and lease assignments, among others.4 The three-word phrase, "land is
unique," is a bastion of property doctrine that reflects land's
historically favored status in the law.
The prominence of the land-is-unique principle suggests
that cases upon which it relies will be resolved in ways that
favor individuals who enjoy interests in land. We would ext Associate Professor, Duquesne University Law School. I wish to thank Dean
Nicholas P. Cafardi for his ongoing support of my research, Elisabeth Molnar,
David Monaghan, and Robert Perkins for their invaluable research assistance,
and the colleagues who generously gave of their time to discuss and review this
article while it was a work in progress.
1. History, in ESSAYS, FIRST AND SECOND SERIES 14 (Ernest Rhys ed. 1906).
2. See, e.g., Brown v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 39 So. 243, 245
(Ala. 1904).
3. State Highway Comm'n v. Vaughan, 470 P.2d 967, 973 (Mont. 1970) (discussing eminent domain); Simplex Techs., Inc. v. Town of Newington, 766 A.2d
713, 717 (N.H. 2001) (discussing variance).
4. See infra note 12.
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pect that specific performance would be routinely granted to
purchasers of real property because land cannot be duplicated. We would assume variances would be freely awarded
because zoning ordinances cannot account for the peculiarities of each parcel of land. Compensation in eminent
domain cases, it would seem, should be based solely on the
unique characteristics of the land taken. Yet the law is not
so consistent. Instead, the impact of land's uniqueness is
indeterminate rather than consistent. The "land is unique"
phraseology is at times little more than a rhetorical device
imparting a broad presumption, and at others land's
uniqueness becomes a legal requirement necessitating strict
proof. In still other situations, the law approaches land's favored status in a more complex manner.
Consider this hypothetical: I enter into a contract to
purchase Blackacre and the seller refuses to go through
with the sale. A court will typically order the contract specifically performed because land is presumed to be unique.5
If I thereafter purchase Blackacre and later seek a variance
that will allow me to use the land in a way not authorized
by the local zoning code, the presumption that allowed my
purchase to go forward disappears, and I will be required to
demonstrate, among other things, that my land is, in fact,
unique.6 If I obtain the variance, and the government later
decides to condemn Blackacre, my land-which only a short
time earlier I successfully proved to be unique-will be
freely compared to other land in order to determine its
value, albeit with consideration of some of my land's unique
characteristics.
The divergent impact of land's uniqueness in these scenarios exposes the uncertain boundaries of the "land is
unique" principle and raises questions about its efficacy as
well as the extent to which the law favors land. One response is to point out that the three scenarios involve different legal groundings: the specific performance cases
involve the common law of contracts;' variances, on the
other hand, are based on the state's police powers and are
5. See, e.g., Breitbach v. Christenson, 541 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Iowa 1995).
6. See, e.g., Simplex Techs., 766 A.2d at 717.
7. See, e.g., Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Taylor, 293 So. 2d 9, 10
(Miss. 1974).
8. See, e.g., Farrington v. Hays, 182 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Mo. 1944) (quoting the
Restatement of Contracts for the proposition that specific performance is
available in real estate contract disputes due to the uniqueness of land).
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statutory in nature;9 and the compensation that is due a
landowner when the government exercises its power of
eminent domain is constitutionally mandated. ° These distinctions are accurate, but alone they fail to explain why
land's uniqueness figures differently in each setting.
This article suggests that the intrinsic qualities that
make land unique are, in fact, not determinative in any of
these situations. Although it is inescapable that land is
relevant in each scenario, the extent to which the unique
characteristics of a parcel of land actually matter ultimately
depends on the public policies at issue and whether those
policies are aligned in favor of private landowners or the
public. The analytical distance from the land itself can be
seen as a reflection of property law's move toward abstraction as well as its growing embrace of community concerns.
Without a fuller articulation of these developments and
relevant policies cases which rely on the "land is unique"
mantra become misleading, offering little guidance for decision makers who face an ever-increasing array of land-related issues.
Courts should therefore modify the extant practice and
clearly identify who should benefit from land's favored
status in each case by analyzing the interests involved. This
approach is still related to the land, but brings the focus
where it actually belongs-on the land-related interests of
private landowners and the public. A more precise and
interest-focused analysis would better reflect the present
perception of property as an abstraction, and would respect
the growing importance of public and community influence
in property law. Such an approach would also allow courts
to concentrate on the uniqueness of land when it does, in
fact, matter, notably in situations involving laws that are
directly concerned with land health." Unfortunately, the

9. See, e.g., Carbonneau v. Town of Exeter, 401 A.2d 675, 677 (N.H. 1979)
(noting that zoning ordinance requires a showing that the applicant's property
is unique).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. A sampling of the federal laws that are concerned with the land includes
the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1600-1614 (2000); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6992k
(2000);
the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000);
and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785

(2000).
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routine application of the "land is unique" phraseology is
seldom accompanied by an explanation of whose interests in
the land should prevail. By replacing rhetoric and indeterminacy with an examination of interests and policies, courts
would more accurately expose the bases of their decisions
and lay the groundwork for a more consistent approach to
the land law of the twenty-first century.
This article will review the three types of cases presented in the hypothetical: specific performance of real
estate sales contracts, variance, and eminent domain. It
will then expose the uncertain and conflicting manner in
which land's uniqueness figures in these cases, suggesting
that courts cling to the idea of land's uniqueness when land
is not, in fact, a determining factor in the decision-making
process. It will further suggest that courts should instead
examine land-related interests and policies and utilize more
precise language to reflect the rationale of their decisions.
Finally, a historical foundation will be offered as an explanation for the current state of the law, and theoretical support will be offered for the interest-focused analytical
alternative.12

12. It has already been pointed out that the notion of land as a unique asset
appears in other types of disputes; those cases will not be explored here.
Although the policy-oriented thesis and appeal for judicial clarity advanced here
could be applied to these cases as well, I have selected the specific performance,
variance, and eminent domain scenarios because they contrast well with one
another and because the underlying law is readily accessible. This article is
primarily intended to raise questions about the law's common use of the "land is
unique" principle and argue for a more interest-centered analysis and judicial
clarity, especially in times of heightened sensitivity to land's amenities. A more
complete cataloging of the cases where the maxim takes on significance awaits
another day. A sampling of those cases include: Baxley-DeLamar Monuments,
Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass'n, 938 F.2d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 1991) (anti-trust);
United States v. Epstein, 27 F. Supp. 2d 404, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (landlordtenant); Wheeler v. Lebanon Valley Auto Racing Corp., 755 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765
(App. Div. 2003) (public nuisance); Knox v. Streatfield, 145 Cal. Rptr. 39, 44 (Ct.
App. 1978) (class action); Partrick v. Preiser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1972) (partition); Emond v. Durfee, 1996 R.I. Super. LEXIS 36 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Jan. 12, 1996) (equal protection).
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I. PRESUMPTION OR PROOF, OR BOTH: THE VARYING IMPACT
OF LAND'S UNIQUENESS

A. Specific Performance
Reading through more than a few specific performance
cases is a mind-numbing exercise. The reason for this is the
remarkable repetition in language regarding the nature of
the remedy, particularly when cases involve real estate
sales contracts gone awry. Facts, rationales, and dispositions at times appear interchangeable. Invariably, courts
seize upon the idea that land's uniqueness warrants the relief requested. So strong is this idea that it is often treated
as a time-honored presumption. 3 Yet when reading these
cases it becomes clear that what truly matters is land ownership and all the benefits it bestows.
Specific performance is an equitable remedy that is
committed to the sound discretion of the court. 4 A plaintiff
must prove the existence of a contract that is definite, reasonable, and supported by adequate consideration. In addition, the plaintiffs part of the bargain must be performed,
or, in the alternative, the plaintiff must be ready, willing,
and able to perform the contract.15 Finally, and most rele13. See, e.g., Henderson v. Fisher, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177 (Ct. App. 1965).
14. See Shelton v. Keller, 748 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988). Courts
will consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether the
remedy is available. See Hilton v. Nelsen, 283 N.W.2d 877, 882-83 (Minn. 1979)
(Specific performance was denied where the court found overreaching, a
misunderstanding by the seller, and other circumstances that made specific performance unfair.). In the exercise of their discretion courts may impose conditions on the parties if warranted by the equities of the case. See Kessler v.
Tortoise Dev., Inc., 1 P.3d 292, 299 (Idaho 2000) (specific performance conditioned on the plaintiff sharing a construction cost overage).
15. See Sossamon v. Davis, 607 S.W.2d 405 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980). A defendant may raise any of the standard defenses to a breach of contract action. See
Howard W. Brill, Specific Performance in Arkansas, 1995 ARK. L. NOTES 17, 19
(1995). These defenses include "lack of an enforceable contract, the Statute of
Frauds, misrepresentation, failure to disclose material information to a contractual partner in a confidential relationship, innocent misrepresentation, and
mistake." Id. Courts will also deny specific performance if it would impose a
"considerable hardship" on the defendant. See Double AA Corp. v. Newland
&
Co., 905 P.2d 138, 142 (Mont. 1995) (buyer denied specific performance in part
due to tax misinformation provided to an estate trustee). The contract must also
be equitable. See In re Estate of Looney, 975 S.W.2d 508, 519 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that specific performance will be denied if a contract is inequitable); Friendship Manor, Inc. v. Greiman, 581 A.2d 893, 898 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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vant to this discussion, there can be no adequate remedy at
law.16
The uniqueness of land becomes relevant when determining whether an adequate remedy of law exists. As one
court wrote: "When land is the subject matter of the agreement, the legal remedy is assumed to be inadequate.... .""
Numerous courts make this connection between land and
the inadequate remedy requirement. For this reason, specific performance is generally awarded in disputes involving
land sales contracts. 8 Courts reason that the uniqueness of
land makes duplication of the contract's subject matter impossible and the calculation of damages difficult.19 Even if a
contract involves both real and personal property, the
strength of the land-is-unique rationale often results in
findings of damage inadequacy. "
So fixed is the concept that land is unique that it creates a presumption that damages are inadequate, making

App. Div. 1990) (pointing out that in order to obtain the remedy the plaintiff
must have acted fairly, and citing Stehr v. Sawyer, 192 A.2d 569, 571 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963)). For a case where specific performance was denied
due to a sales price that was "shockingly inadequate," see Miller v. Coffeen, 280
S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. 1955) (stating that although the mere inadequacy of consideration is insufficient to defeat specific performance, facts suggesting inadequacy plus "other inequitable incidents" can result in the denial of the remedy).
For a case where specific performance was denied because the contract had
been fully performed, see Breitbach v. Christenson, 541 N.W.2d 840, 843-44
(Iowa 1995) (stating that where contract provided that buyer's rights would
terminate if an option holder exercised his right to purchase and where option
holder had done so, specific performance was inappropriate).
16. See, e.g., Porporato v. Devincenzi, 68 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213 (Ct. App. 1968);
Brill, supra note 15, at 18.
17. Flack v. Laster, 417 A.2d 393, 400 (D.C. 1980).
18. See, e.g., Brown v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 39 So. 243, 244
(Ala. 1904). Some courts call specific performance a "matter of right" in cases
involving land sales contracts. See Kalinowski v. Yeh, 847 P.2d 673, 678 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Giannini v. First Nat'l Bank of Des Plaines, 483 N.E.2d
924, 933 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)).
19. See Williams v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 8 B.R. 806, 811 (D.D.C. 1981)
(regarding difficulties in damage calculation); Kalinowski, 847 P.2d at 678;
Hancock v. Dusenberry, 715 P.2d 360, 365 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (regarding the
impossibility of duplication); see also Suchan v. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434, 438
(Idaho 1966); Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194, 196 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1974); Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 749 (R.I.
1995). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (1981).
20. See Henderson v. Fisher, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177 (Ct. App. 1965); State ex
rel. Place v. Bland, 183 S.W.2d 878, 890 (Mo. 1944) (en banc).
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an award of specific performance virtually automatic.21 A
California appellate court has written,
[We note first, as to the inadequacy of plaintiffs' remedy at law, it
is the general rule that in the case of a contract for the transfer of
an interest in land it is presumed that damages would not adequately compensate for the breach. This presumption is based on
the historic treatment of land as unique. Therefore, in cases involving the breach of a contract to transfer an interest in land,
specific performance will be granted as a matter of course unless
some other equitable reason for denial is shown. Accordingly, the
party seeking specific performance need not establish inadequacy
of the legal remedy and may rely upon this presumption.22

As this quote points out, aggrieved buyers are normally
relieved of having to prove inadequacy in land sales disputes. Some courts stop short of declaring that land's
uniqueness establishes an outright presumption of inadequacy and instead state that the land is presumed to be
unique (as opposed to presuming that damages are inadequate), but the results are typically the same.2 3 This is so
even in cases in which courts address whether the presumption is rebuttable. 4
It becomes clear that the ready availability of specific
performance in land sales contract disputes is tied to those
three magic words-"land is unique"--and that this presumption normally establishes that an aggrieved buyer has
21. See Jasmin v. Alberico, 376 A.2d 32, 33 (Vt. 1977) (noting that specific
performance is almost a "matter of course" in contracts involving land).
22. Henderson v. Fisher, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(citations omitted).
23. Some courts use the phrase "virtual presumption." See Friendship
Manor, Inc. v. Greiman, 581 A.2d 893, 897 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990);
Mesa Dev. Corp. v. Meyer, 616 A.2d 954, 956 (N.J. App. Div. 1992). Other courts
"assume" damages are unique. See Farrington v. Hays, 182 S.W.2d 186, 190
(stating the assumption arises "inalmost every case in which action is brought
to enforce specific performance of a contract for the sale of land" and that the
showing of facts pertaining to inadequacy is unnecessary); accord Turley v.
Adams, 484 P.2d 668, 673 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); Suchan, 410 P.2d at 438. Still
others mention nothing about a presumption and merely state that a plaintiff
does not have to prove uniqueness in such cases. See, e.g., Kalinowski, 847 P.2d
at 679. For cases discussing the presumption of land being unique, see
Breitbach v. Christenson, 541 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Iowa 1995), and Archway
Motors, Inc. v. Herman, 378 A.2d 720, 724 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
24. See Hancock v. Dusenberry, 715 P.2d 360, 365 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (deferring to trial court's determination that land was unique and ordering specific
performance of a right of first refusal).
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no legal remedy. Further, the impossibility of acquiring a
duplicate parcel of land and difficulties in valuing the land
are the reasons that courts presume inadequacy exists.
Both of these rationales, while related to the land, are less
involved with the characteristics of the land itself than with
the interests of a would-be landowner.
A closer examination of the specific performance cases
bears this out. When discussing both the duplication and
valuation problems, courts often allude to a buyer's sentimental attachment to the land, suggesting that the land is
less important than what it means to the buyer.25 Personal
attachment to land is not always emotional, but can also be
related to status. This aspect of land ownership dates from
medieval England, when the ownership of real property
conferred political power as well as social status.26 Even today, land ownership is an indicia of wealth and status and
is viewed differently from ownership of personal property. 7
These arguments suggest that land is unique not only
because of what land ownership means, but also because of
the long-accepted distinction between real and personal
property. Over thirty years ago, Professor Arthur Leff
wrote, "widgits and Blackacre are not the same, are not
dealt with by parties in the same way and (at least
arguably) ought not to be treated identically in the law."
For one thing, land transactions occur less frequently and
carry greater economic significance than transactions involving personal property. And although the characteristics
of land tend to be important when land is sold, the significance lies in what those characteristics mean to the buyer. 9
25. See Lawrence V. Berkovich, To Pay or to Convey?: A Theory of Remedies
for Breach of Real Estate Contracts, 1995 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 319, 346-47 (1995).
26. See id. at 347-48 (arguing that the political and social benefits
associated with land ownership have been replaced in today's world by economic
benefits and contesting the idea that land's uniqueness was tied to the impossibility of finding a substitute).
27. The countless housing advertisements that portray home ownership as
superior to renting are examples of society's positive perception of landownership.
28. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 534-35 (1967) (arguing that the unconscionability doctrine makes less sense in the law of sales than it does in land sales contracts).
29. See id. at 535-37 (noting that three characteristics of real estate saleseconomic significance, infrequency, and characteristics of land-combine into a
"Gestalt of real property").
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Land's favored status in the law is thus steeped in history and tied to perceived differences between real and personal property. A number of specific performance cases
allude to this special status," as does the Restatement of
Contracts." Arguably, every specific performance case that
mentions land's uniqueness attests to its favored status.
Yet cases consistently demonstrate that it is not the land
that is favored so much as land ownership, suggesting that
what actually matters are the expectations and benefits
that arise from that ownership.
Thus, the judicial tendency to freely grant specific performance to buyers because "land is unique" is one that is in
reality founded on the protection of each buyer's expectations related to the land, whether they are expectations of
financial or social advancement, or those that are caught up
with sentimental attachment or aesthetic enjoyment. In response to the initial question, "What's land got to do with
it?," it might be said that, in the realm of specific performance, it is not so much the land itself, but rather the highly
prized benefits of land ownership that matter.
The attenuated relationship between land and the "land
is unique" rationale is even more apparent in specific performance cases that address the mutuality doctrine, a doctrine which provides that a non-breaching party cannot obtain specific performance unless the same remedy is
available to the breaching party.32 The doctrine therefore
allows a seller to have a land sales contract specifically performed without having to prove that damages are inadequate.3 In seller-plaintiff cases, courts typically rely on
land's uniqueness and problems associated with the calculation of damages in order to establish damage inadequacy.
Courts also reason that, because land is not easily converted into money, a breach by the buyer will prevent a
seller from making new investments.3 4 The mutuality doctrine has fallen into disfavor in recent years, leading some
courts to refuse sellers the same presumption afforded buy30. See, e.g., Farrington v. Hays, 182 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Mo. 1944).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360.
32. See Henderson v. Fisher, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177 (Ct. App. 1965); Brill,
supra note 15, at 19.
33. See, e.g., State v. Place, 183 S.W.2d 878, 890 (Mo. 1944); Deans v.
Layton, 366 S.E.2d 560, 568 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
34. Archway Motors, Inc. v. Herman, 378 A.2d 720, 725 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1977).
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ers.35 Courts often point out that the doctrine is subject to
many exceptions and no longer automatically allows a seller
to obtain specific performance.36 As a result, sellers who
seek specific performance often have to prove that monetary
damages are inadequate. 37 Despite the weakening of the
mutuality doctrine, the rationales for allowing a seller to
obtain specific performance, which focus on the inability to
calculate damages and investment delay, once again have
less to do with the land than the benefits arising from its
alienation.
Analogizing to land sales contract cases, courts have extended the "land is unique" rationale to a number of situations. A common example is the imposition of a constructive
trust when a decedent's estate is sued for failure to comply
with an inter-vivos promise regarding the disposition of real
property. 5 In other cases land's uniqueness has led courts
to set aside foreclosure sales,39 enjoin waste," and quiet titles.41 Courts have also relied on land's uniqueness when
granting specific performance of construction loan commitments, and when ordering injunctive relief to prevent the
35. See Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194, 196-98 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1974) (noting that mutuality, alone, is insufficient to grant a seller specific performance, requiring seller to prove that equities demand such relief).
36. See Suchan v. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Idaho 1966); see also
Centex Homes, 320 A.2d at 196 (noting that damages are normally available to a
seller upon a buyer's breach).
37. See Mesa Dev. Corp. v. Meyer, 616 A.2d 954, 956-57 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1992).
38. See Turley v. Adams, 484 P.2d 668, 673 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); Porporato
v. Devincenzi, 68 Cal. Rptr. 210, 215 (Ct. App. 1968).
39. See Hackin v. Superior Court, 425 P.2d 420, 421-22 (Ariz. 1967) (relying,
in part, on the uniqueness of land and inadequacy of a damage remedy).
40. See Walsh v. Powell, 76 Pa. D. & C. 108, 114 (Dela. Cty. Ct. Common
Pleas 1951) (noting that the land's uniqueness rendered damages inadequate).
41. In one case title was quieted in reversioners upon the breach of a
condition in a defeasible estate. See Ludwig v. William K. Warren Found., 809
P.2d 660, 663 (Ok. 1990) (relying on the specific performance rule).
42. See Selective Builders, Inc. v. Hudson City Sav. Bank, 349 A.2d 564, 569
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (likening the dispute to one involving a land
sales contract); First Nat'l State Bank v. Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 610 F.2d 164, 172-73 (3d Cir. 1979) (analogizing to Selective Builders,
and affirming grant of specific performance to construction lender against permanent lender); see also Southampton Wholesale Food Terminal v. Providence
Produce Warehouse Co., 129 F. Supp. 663, 664 (D. Mass. 1955) ("Since the law
regards land as unique an agreement to buy land can be specifically enforced
even though the defendant's sole obligation is to pay money." (quoting Greene v.
Marshall, 108 F.2d 717 (1st Cir. 1940))).

2003]

WHAT'S LAND GOT TO DO WITH IT?

397

interference with a plaintiffs development rights.43 As in
the specific performance cases, land is involved in all of
these cases, but is at most a trigger that allows courts to
protect various interests associated with property ownership.
While awards of specific performance are the norm in
disputes involving land sales contracts, the remedy is not
automatic. Courts have denied relief when convinced that
the land is not unique. This would appear to prove that
courts are, in fact, very much concerned with the characteristics of the land. However, these cases typically involve
situations where the rights related to real property ownership can be vindicated without resorting to the extraordinary remedy of specific performance. In one case, specific
performance was denied to a seller who sought to have the
buyers go through with the purchase of agricultural land."
In addition to questioning the validity of the mutuality doctrine, the court found that the land was not unique and that
its market value could be easily determined.45 In other
cases, courts have determined that ranch land and condominium units are not unique. The land-is-unique presumption has been rejected in similar cases as well. For example, in one unreported decision, injunctive relief aimed at
halting a mortgage foreclosure, which was premised on the
land's uniqueness, was denied because the plaintiffs interest in the land was determined to be predominantly economic.47 And in a rare case where a lot owner mistakenly
made improvements to an adjacent lot that was virtually
identical to his own, a court agreed to a land exchange
rather than ejectment."
43. See New Eastwick Corp. v. Phila. Builders Eastwick Corp., 241 A.2d
766, 770 (Pa. 1968) (noting that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if
not allowed to prevail because of the "unique and intrinsic value of land").
44. Suchan v. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434 (Idaho 1966).
45. See id. at 438.
46. See, e.g., Double AA Corp. v. Newland & Co., 905 P.2d 138, 142 (Mont.
1995). Curiously, the court claimed that the land was not any more unique than
ranch land already owned by the buyer "except that it was contiguous with
property he owned in the Paradise Valley." Id. It would seem that the contiguity
of the land in question would render it uniquely valuable. See also Centex
Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194, 198 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1974)
(discussing condominiums).
47. Medgar Evers Houses Assoc. v. Carro, 2001 US Dist. LEXIS 18594, at
*13-15 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
48. See Brown v. Davis, 514 So. 2d 54, 56-57 (Fla. 1987).

398

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

In these cases, courts refused specific performance or
other relief because monetary damages were deemed adequate or another remedy accomplished justice between the
parties. In each situation the land was considered fungible.
Nonetheless, these cases are similar to those in which specific performance is granted because of the shared goal of
protecting a plaintiffs expectation interest related to real
property. Land makes a difference in all of these cases, but
not because of its unique characteristics. Rather, the law
protects the ownership of land and the host of unique rights
and expectations that accompany it, either by specific performance when those interests render a damage remedy inadequate, or by damages in cases where those interests can
be quantified. Instead of clearly indicating that human
desires drive these decisions, courts slavishly resort to the
land-is-unique slogan-both as a starting and ending
point-masking the true policies at play.
B. Variance
A variance authorizes a departure from a zoning restriction by permitting an otherwise prohibited land use or
by providing relief from a height, area, or other non-use restriction.49 Variances are creatures of statute, and applicants routinely are required to demonstrate that they are
unduly burdened by their land's uniqueness." There are no
presumptions of uniqueness in this domain; instead, proof
of the land's peculiarity is a prerequisite to obtaining relief.
Just as a plaintiff must prove inadequacy of damages to obtain specific performance, the applicant for a variance must
demonstrate unnecessary hardship.5 For both requirements, land's uniqueness is crucial, yet in one instance a
presumption of uniqueness exists while in the other strict
proof is required. The different treatment of land's uniqueness does not mean that land enjoys a less-favored status in
land use law than it does in the law of real estate sales.
Rather, the interests the law protects when variances are at

49. See North v. St. Mary's County, 638 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Md. Ct. App.
1994).
50. See, e.g., Simplex Techs., Inc. v. Town of Newington, 766 A.2d 713, 717
(N.H. 2001).
51. See id.
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issue are more diverse; more specifically, community interests as well as individual concerns must be considered.
The rules that regulate variances differ from those that
govern specific performance of real estate contracts, not
only because they are statutory in nature, but because they
arguably deal more directly with land than title." However,
the fact that zoning ordinances require a landowner to
prove that the land is unique in order to obtain a variance
hardly means that the guiding policy is one of concern for
the land itself. Instead, policies related to local land use determinations and the interests of landowners are of paramount importance. Once the unique land requirement of
variance cases is examined in this fashion, it becomes more
easily reconciled with the specific performance presumption
of inadequacy.
Countless municipalities have enacted ordinances
authorizing variances with substantially similar requirements." A landowner must prove that unnecessary hardship will result if a variance is not granted, that the spirit
of the ordinance will be respected if the variance is granted,
that the public interest will be served and that the variance will result in substantial justice. V Other jurisdictions
present the test more succinctly, requiring a showing that
physical conditions of the land are unique to the applicant's
land and are not general to the neighborhood, that the
unique characteristics of the land make it incapable of
yielding a reasonable return if the ordinance is strictly
enforced, and that a variance will not alter the essential
character of the area.55 The requirements of deprivation of a
reasonable use of the land, the land's uniqueness, and concern for the intent and purpose of the zoning code are
nearly universal.56 Some jurisdictions may additionally limit
52. See Richard Roeser Profl Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 793
A.2d 545, 560 (Md. Ct. App. 2002).
53. State enabling legislation authorizes local governments to engage in
zoning. See Cromwell v. Ward, 651 A.2d 424, 430 (Md. Ct. App. 1995). Courts
and commentators agree that the requirements for obtaining a variance do not
differ substantially from state to state, in particular the requirement regarding
the uniqueness of the land. See id. at 434, 438 (citing 8 EUGENE MCQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 252.167 (3d ed. rev. 1991)).
54. See Rowe v. Town of North Hampton, 553 A.2d 1331, 1333 (N.H. 1989).
55. See Zimtbaum v. Glass, 302 N.Y.S.2d 345, 346 (App. Div. 1969)
(referring to New York City's zoning ordinance).
56. See Anon v. City of Coral Gables, 336 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1332
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the granting of variances to the minimum relief required
under the circumstances or demand proof that the variance
will not interfere with rights of others.57 Regardless of the
extent of the provisions, the applicant typically has the
burden of proving each element set forth in the zoning ordinance. 8 Not surprisingly, variances are considered an exceptional remedy and are only sparingly granted. 9
Generally, in order to prove unnecessary hardship an
applicant must prove a causal link between the ordinance
and the hardship. 0 The applicant must also show that the
restriction prevents the landowner from making any reasonable use of the land."' Some jurisdictions employ different terminology, such as "unwarranted hardship,"6 2 "practical difficulty or particular hardship,"63 "unreasonable
(Haw. 1998) (dealing with height variance); Nolan v. City of Eden Prairie, 610
N.W.2d 697, 701 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Anfuso v. Seeley, 579 A.2d 817, 828
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); In re Congregation Beth El v. Crowley, 30
Misc. 2d 90, 92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (relying on the common law test for a variance).
57. See Whitpain Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Whitpain Township
Zoning Hearing Bd., 550 A.2d 1355, 1360 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), and Simplex
Techs., Inc. v. Town of Newington, 766 A.2d 713, 717 (N.H. 2001), respectively.
58. See Torak v. Bd. of Adjustment, 277 A.2d 521, 523 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1971); Arndorfer v. Sauk County Bd. of Adjustment, 469 N.W.2d 831, 834 (Wis.
1991).
59. See Cromwell v. Ward, 651 A.2d 424, 430, 434 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995)
(noting that variance approvals are seldom affirmed); W. Torresdale Civic Ass'n
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 576 A.2d 352, 356 (Pa. 1988) (Larson, J.
dissenting) (citing Township of Haverford v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 344 A.2d 758
(1975)); Torak, 277 A.2d at 525; Lumund v. Bd. of Adjustment, 73 A.2d 545, 549
(N.J. 1950).
60. See North v. St. Mary's County, 638 A.2d 1175, 1180 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994).
61. See Downtown Neighborhoods Ass'n v. City of Albuquerque, 783 P.2d
962, 967 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); see also Metro. Dade County v. Betancourt, 559
So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Kismet Investors, Inc. v. County of
Benton, 617 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Nolan, 610 N.W.2d at 701;
Wells & Highway 21 Corp. v. Yates, 897 S.W.2d 56, 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (requiring a showing that the land cannot yield a reasonable return if used in
compliance with the zoning ordinance); Simplex Techs., 766 A.2d at 716; In re
Consol. Edison Co. v. Hoffman, 43 N.Y.2d 598, 607 (N.Y. 1978); Larsen v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 654 A.2d 256, 259 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), affd, 659
A.2d 562 (Pa. 1995); see also Labrecque v. Town of Salem, 514 A.2d 829, 830
(N.H. 1986); Anfuso, 579 A.2d at 828-29 (tying undue hardship to "economic inutility" of the land).
62. See North v. St. Mary's County, 638 A.2d at 1180.
63. See Burke v. Vill. of Glenview, 628 N.E.2d 465, 467 (Ill. App. 1993);
Kismet Investors, Inc., 617 N.W.2d at 90; Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning
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hardship,"64 or "undue hardship."6 Regardless of language,
an applicant must show that the zoning ordinance disproportionately impacts the land;" mere inconvenience is
insufficient. Additionally, the hardship cannot be selfimposed. 68
Importantly, in order to demonstrate unnecessary
hardship the applicant for a variance must demonstrate
that the land is unique. Specifically, there must be proof
that the hardship relates to, or is caused by, unique characteristics of the applicant's land.69 Some cases employ a twostep approach for unnecessary hardship. First, there must
be proof that the land is unique "in and of itself' and differBd. of Adjustment, 247 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Wis. 1976) (noting there is no difference
in meaning between "practical difficulty" and "unnecessary hardship").
64. See Cromwell, 651 A.2d at 426.
65. See Nolan, 610 N.W.2d at 701.
66. See Cromwell, 651 A.2d at 426.
67. See Snyder, 247 N.W.2d at 102, 103-04 (indicating that self-imposed
hardship and inconvenience caused by a zoning ordinance do not amount to
unnecessary hardship). Two unreported Wisconsin cases where hardship was
based on a landowner's plight and therefore a variance was improper involve a
landowner's application for a variance to expand a house because of a growing
family, and a business owner's attempt to obtain a variance to reduce the number of parking spaces required under a zoning ordinance because his mall was
not successful. See Erickson v. St. Croix County Bd. of Adjustment, 545 N.W.2d
520 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); Krist, Inc. v. Vill. of Sister Bay, 506 N.W.2d 427 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1993).
68. See Burke, 628 N.E.2d at 467; Cromwell, 651 A.2d at 431; Nolan, 610
N.W.2d at 701; Fasani v. Rappaport, 290 N.Y.S.2d 279, 282 (App. Div. 1968);
Whitpain Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Whitpain Township Zoning Hearing
Bd., 550 A.2d 1355, 1360 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). Courts will often find a selfimposed hardship when a landowner purchases property with prior knowledge
of a zoning restriction. See Metro. Dade County v. Betancourt, 559 So. 2d 1237,
1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Torak v. Bd. of Adjustment, 277 A.2d 521, 525
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971). But see Richard Roeser Profl Builder, Inc. v. Anne
Arundel County, 793 A.2d 545, 561 (Md. 2002) (indicating that a variance will
not necessarily be denied where applicant purchased property with knowledge
of the zoning restriction); accord Anon v. City of Coral Gables, 336 So. 2d 420,
423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
69. Some cases hold that zoning provisions combined with the land's
uniqueness must be the "proximate cause" of the hardship. See Cromwell, 651
A.2d at 431-32; see also Colton Real Estate Corp. v. W. Conshohocken Zoning
Hearing Bd., 546 A.2d 1315, 1317-18 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (remanding case in
which Board denied signage variance on landlocked parcel in a residential area,
stating that unnecessary hardship exists if the land's uniqueness renders it unusable for any permitted use); Arndorfer v. Sauk County Bd. of Adjustment, 469
N.W.2d 831, 834 (Wis. 1991) (granting a variance from a sewage ordinance
where landowners claimed the uniqueness of their soil prevented them from
constructing a conventional sewage system).
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ent from neighboring properties, causing the zoning ordinance to disproportionately impact the applicant. The second step inquires whether unreasonable hardship results
from the disproportionate impact." Thus, the land's uniqueness alone is insufficient to support a variance. In addition,
there must be proof that the strict application of the
ordinance to the unique land results in unnecessary
hardship. 7
If neighboring lands suffer from the same hardship a
variance will not be granted. Courts routinely state that an
applicant's land must have unique characteristics that distinguish it from nearby property." Zoning ordinances often
set forth specific characteristics that make land unique. For
example, the provisions of a zoning ordinance in one
Maryland county authorize a variance when, "by reason of
the exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or unusual shape
of a specific ... property. . . or by reason of exceptional
topographic conditions or other extraordinary situation or
special condition of... property," the literal enforcement of
the zoning ordinance would create "unwarranted hardship."73
Significantly, the unnecessary hardship test focuses on
the cause of the hardship, not its effects. 4 A common refrain
in the case law states, "it is not uniqueness of the plight of
the owner, but uniqueness of the land causing the plight
that is the criterion."75 Alternatively, cases often state that
70. Cromwell, 651 A.2d at 426.
71. See Downtown Neighborhoods Ass'n v. City of Albuquerque, 783 P.2d
962, 968 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
72. See Betancourt, 559 So. 2d at 1239; Gullickson v. Stark County Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 474 N.W.2d 890, 892 (N.D. 1991); Simplex Techs., Inc. v.
Town of Newington, 766 A.2d 713, 717 (N.H. 2001); Arndorfer, 469 N.W.2d at
834.
73. Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County, 513 A.2d
893, 909 (Md. 1986) (quoting Section 20.46 of the Queen Anne County zoning
ordinance); see also Downtown Neighborhoods Ass'n v. City of Albuquerque, 783
P.2d 962, 968 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (referring to the governing ordinance).
74. See State v. Winnebago County, 540 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
75. Carbonneau v. Town of Exeter, 401 A.2d 675, 677 (N.H. 1979) (quoting 1
R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 18.30, at 219 (2d ed. 1977)); Fasani v.
Rappaport, 290 N.Y.S.2d 279, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968). For example, in
Cromwell, 651 A.2d at 426, a landowner who built a structure in violation of a
height restriction and who thereafter applied for a variance claiming that the
existing structure made the land unique, failed to establish unnecessary
hardship because the land itself was not unique and the hardship was self-imposed. Id. at 432.
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unnecessary hardship focuses on the land, rather than the
personal situation of the applicant.76 The fact that an owner
cannot use his or her land for one purpose does not amount
to unnecessary hardship when another reasonable use is
permitted." Similarly, many cases reiterate that the inability to maximize profits or other economic hardship will not
constitute unnecessary hardship.78
This undeniable focus on the land rather than an
owner's needs and desires distinguishes variance from specific performance cases, which routinely pay homage to the
desires of landowners. As suggested earlier, this difference
can be explained by a policy shift. The presumption of
land's uniqueness in specific performance cases furthers the
enjoyment of land by the person who values it most and
who will arguably put it to productive use. The very transaction involved (the sale of real property) deals with productivity and the free alienation of land, two hallmark policies of property law.79 When it comes to land use regulation,
the policies differ. Instead of focusing on individual preferences and alienability, courts liberally protect the exercise
76. See Gullickson v. Stark County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 474 N.W.2d 890,
892 (N.D. 1991); Larsen v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 654 A.2d 256, 260 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995) (stating that personal desires of landowner are insufficient
for grant of a variance); McClurkan v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 565 S.W.2d 495,
497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that the primary concern in awarding a variance is the land's uniqueness rather than the personal hardship of the applicant); see also Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawaii v. Sullivan, 953
P.2d 1315, 1332 (Haw. 1998) (stating that the reasonable use of land is not the
same as the most desired use of land).
77. See City of Merriam v. Metroplex Bus. Comm. Group, Ltd., 748 P.2d 883,
888-90 (Kan. 1988); Rowe v. Town of Salem, 403 A.2d 428, 429 (N.H. 1979).
78. See Cromwell, 651 A.2d at 432 (stating that desirability and profitability
of variance are insufficient); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 199
N.W.2d 525, 530 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (stating that "the fact that the property
would be worth more if the variance were granted is not sufficient to sustain a
variance"); Rowe v. Town of North Hampton, 553 A.2d 1331, 1334 (N.H. 1989)
(applicant's argument that permitted uses are not economically viable is unpersuasive in variance determination); Bierce v. Gross, 135 A.2d 561, 567 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (holding that profit motive alone will not support a
variance); Torak v. Board of Adjustment, 277 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1971); State v. Winnebago County, 540 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); see
also Town of Indialantic v. Nance, 485 So.2d 1318, 1319-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Kismet Investors, Inc. v. County of Benton, 617 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000); Margate Motel, Inc. v. Town of Gilford, 534 A.2d 717, 719-20 (N.H.
1987).
79. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1780-1860
3, 34 (1977).
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of the police power by local governments, in particular their
authority to manage land use and development within their
borders.5' Zoning stabilizes real estate values and enhances
the general welfare of each zoning district,81 benefits that
have been recognized for over half a century." Because
variances disrupt these policies, most ordinances strictly
limit their availability by demanding a showing that the
land's uniqueness renders literal application of a zoning ordinance unreasonable. Courts, in turn, closely examine each
variance for compliance with the law.
Variance cases often allude to these policies. One case
notes that "[t]he 'uniqueness' element is necessary to prevent the purposes of the zoning regulations from being undermined by the granting of piecemeal exceptions to those
regulations."" Of paramount concern is the potential for the
incremental destruction of a zoning scheme. 4 These sentiments are also reflected in provisions that require variances
to be consistent with the public interest, true to the spirit of
the ordinance, or to be as limited as possible.85
Not all of the policies that guide variance law focus on
the community, however. The fear that zoning restrictions
might unduly infringe upon private property rights is also
implicated. Indeed, respect for property rights and due process is the reason the variance mechanism exists. Where
the impact of a zoning ordinance on land that differs from
others in the same district renders a landowner's property
useless, the application of the ordinance may be deemed

80. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (holding that a zoning classification will be upheld if it is "fairly debatable").
81. See Lumund v. Bd. of Adjustment, 73 A.2d 545, 549 (N.J. 1950).
82. See id. (noting the increasing prevalence of these policies in 1950).
83. Arndorfer v. Sauk County Bd. of Adjustment, 469 N.W.2d 831, 834 (Wis.
1991).
84. See Wells & Highway 21 Corp. v. Yates, 897 S.W.2d 56, 62 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995); State v. Rock County Bd. of Adjustment, 498 N.W.2d 912 (Wis. Ct. App.
1992). Some courts fear that chaos would result if variances were easily
granted. See Cromwell v. Ward, 651 A.2d 424, 430-31 (Md. Ct. App. 1995).
85. See Arndorfer, 469 N.W.2d at 832, Larsen v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
654 A.2d 256, 260 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), and Metro. Dade County v.
Betancourt, 559 So. 2d 1237, 1239-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), respectively.
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confiscatory.86 Variances thus operate as "escape valves"
that avoid regulatory takings.87
Variance law and related policies recognize land's
uniqueness and, in turn, its favored status in the law by acknowledging that parcels of land differ from one another
and that these differences, in conjunction with specific
zoning restrictions, can result in unnecessary hardship that
should be avoided. Despite the legislative focus on the land,
the dominant policies are tied to the orderly development of
land, the preservation of market value, and the avoidance of
uncompensated takings. Land's uniqueness is merely one
piece of a puzzle which, when complete, authorizes a limited
and rare departure from a local zoning plan.88
The notion of land's uniqueness becomes even less important in cases dealing with non-use variances. The majority of jurisdictions do not require unnecessary hardship
when a landowner seeks a variance from a restriction that
governs things other than use.89 In National Boatland, Inc.
v. FarmingtonHills Zoning Board of Appeals," for example,
a "practical difficulty" standard was employed in affirming
the denial of a variance from tree and wall requirements.
The court explained that in some jurisdictions practical difficulty requires proof that the land's uniqueness causes the
problem;9 in others, a landowner must prove that the "literal enforcement would have an effect so adverse as to preclude full enjoyment of the intended use."93 Alternatively,
other jurisdictions impose a three-part test, requiring proof
that compliance with the law would unreasonably bar the
owner from using the property for a permitted purpose or
be unnecessarily burdensome; that the variance, if granted,
86. See Gullickson v. Stark County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 474 N.W.2d 890,
892 (N.D. 1991).
87. See State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 628 N.W.2d 376, 388
(Wis. 2001) (quoting 3 E.C. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 21-2, at 264
(4th ed. 1979)).
88. For an interesting and rare case to the contrary, see McLean v. Soley,
310 A.2d 783 (Md. 1973), where the court ruled that a variance from an
ordinance regulating set backs for side yard windows was properly granted
where compliance would destroy the unique topography and ecology of the land.
89. 3 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 20.48 (4th
ed. 1996).
90. 380 N.W.2d 472 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
91. Id. at 476.
92. Id. at 476-77.
93. Id. at 477 (citing Rhode Island case law).
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would result in substantial injustice to both the landowner
and the neighboring landowners; and that the spirit of the
ordinance would be observed.94 Some jurisdictions impose
an "unnecessarily burdensome" test for area variances,
which requires a landowner to demonstrate that "compliance with the strict letter of the restriction governing area,
set backs, frontage, height, bulk or density would unreasonably prevent the owner from using the property for a
permitted purpose or would render conformity with such
restrictions unnecessarily burdensome."95 Regardless of the
test, the relaxation of the unnecessary hardship test in nonuse variance situations suggests that the private property
rights of landowners are given greater weight when matters
such as area, height, and setbacks are concerned, while the
aims of local planners diminish in importance.
It is not uncommon, then, for zoning ordinances to impose a more lenient standard of hardship when a non-use
variance is sought. What is less common are decisions in
which courts depart from the strict requirements of the traditional unnecessary hardship test in use variance situations. Recently, the New Hampshire Supreme Court moved
in this direction. After reviewing precedent in which unnecessary hardship was held to mean that the application of
the ordinance effectively barred a landowner from making
"any reasonable use of the land," the court decided to
change course.96 It pointed out that a balance must be
struck between property rights and exercises of the police
power in order to protect landowners from unreasonable

94. Id. at 476-77. The court also noted that commentators favor this test. Id.
(citing 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 45-28-29 (3d ed. 1972)).
The court embraced the latter test, noting that the landowner failed to prove its
second prong. Id. at 478. See also Cunningham v. Kerst, 203 A.2d 636, 637-38
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (imposing a practical difficulty test where landowner
sought an area variance, requiring proof that the owner was not able to use the
property without violating the ordinance and that the literal enforcement of the
ordinance would result in significant costs).
95. Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 247 N.W.2d 98,
102 (Wis. 1976). Although the distinction between use and area variances was
later eliminated in State v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment, 577 N.W.2d
813, 821 (Wis. 1998), just three years later Kenosha County was criticized by a
plurality of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See infra note 97.
96. Simplex Tech., Inc. v. Town of Newington, 766 A.2d 713, 716 (N.H.
2001).
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zoning restrictions.9 7 Rejecting existing rules as too restrictive, the court held that unnecessary hardship in use variance cases must include proof that:
(1) a zoning restriction as applied to [the applicant's] property
interferes with [the applicant's] reasonable use of the property,
considering the unique setting of the property in its environment;
(2) no fair and substantial relationship exists between the general
purposes of the zoning ordinance and the specific restriction on the
property; and (3) the 98variance would not injure the public or
private rights of others.

By requiring mere interference with an owner's reasonable use of the property and consideration, rather than
proof, of the unique attributes of the land, this test, like the
relaxed standard employed in non-use variance cases, is
more sympathetic to a land owner's property rights. Variance requirements interpreted in this way are even further
removed from the land, but remain focused on community
goals and private property rights. Again, when inquiring
whether land has anything to do with variance cases, the
response is that the land plays merely a background role in
a decision-making process which seeks to balance community planning with individual interests in land.
97. Id. at 716-17 (noting the rule that zoning regulations "must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the regulation").
98. Id. at 717. In a similar way, a lead opinion, in which three Wisconsin
Supreme Court justices joined, concluded that their own recent, unanimous
ruling that erased the distinction between area and use variances should be
overruled. See State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 628 N.W.2d 376,
378 (Wis. 2001) (criticizing State v. Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 577
N.W.2d 813 (Wis. 1998) and stating that it should be overruled). In doing so, the
opinion focused on that aspect of the unnecessary hardship test that requires a
landowner to prove that no reasonable use of the property can be made if the
ordinance is strictly applied. Outagamie, 628 N.W.2d at 378. The judges felt
that the Kenosha County test, which now applies to all variances in the state,
makes it nearly impossible to obtain any type of variance. Id. at 377-78. The
opinion held that a balance between private property rights and the police
power requires the reinstatement of the distinction between area and use
variances. Id. at 381, 389 (ruling that use variances should be governed by the
unnecessary hardship test and area variances should be governed by an unnecessarily burdensome standard). A majority of the court refused to overrule
Kenosha County, and ruled instead that the variance in question was justified
because of a conflict between the state's administrative code and enabling legislation which vested local boards of adjustment with discretion over zoning
matters. Id. at 378.
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C. Eminent Domain
Like specific performance cases, eminent domain cases
deal with the transfer of title to real property. Yet instead
of a voluntary conveyance of land, eminent domain cases
involve the involuntary loss of title. Like variance cases,
eminent domain cases pit the rights of private landowners
against government powers. But rather than the tension
between a landowner's right to freely develop land in a way
that conflicts with a local government's development plan,
eminent domain cases balance the right to own land against
the sovereign's right to take it. Once again, land's uniqueness figures prominently, but the law handles it in yet a different way. Well aware that a liberal application of the
land-is-unique principle would paralyze the appropriation
powers of government, courts have fashioned a compromise
which, to a limited extent, treats land as a commodity.
It is axiomatic that in order for the government to take
private property, there must be a public purpose and just
compensation must be paid.99 The just compensation
requirement, which strives to make a landowner whole,1 °° is
based on actual value, which is synonymous with market
value.' Market value, in turn, refers to the highest and
best use to which the land can be put, whether or not it is
currently used for that purpose."°2 Some jurisdictions measure damages in an eminent domain case as the difference in
fair market value of the landowner's land before condemnation, without considering the impact of the condemnation,
and the fair market value of the property in the remaining
land after the taking, factoring in the impact of the government's action.' Both the land taken and the "effective
use and value of' the remainder, if any, need to be considered."' Whatever the formulation of just compensation,
courts routinely recognize that land is unique.'O'
99. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002).
100. See Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont'l Dev. Corp., 941
P.2d 809, 822 (Cal. 1997) (referring to the state's just compensation clause).
101. See State Highway Comm'n v. Vaughan, 470 P.2d 967, 970 (Mont.

1970).
102. Id.
103. Klick v. Dep't of Transp., 342 A.2d 794, 800 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)
(making reference to state statutory provisions governing eminent domain).
104. Id. Severance damages reflect the "diminution in the fair market value
of the remainder of the property owner's land, which is both unique to that land
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The just compensation requirement certainly implicates
land's uniqueness; a landowner will not feel satisfied unless
all of the particular characteristics of the condemned land
are accounted for. Yet specific performance cases teach us
that the inherent uniqueness of land makes it impossible to
value. If this is true, it would be impossible to calculate just
compensation in all eminent domain cases. At one time, this
problem was recognized by an exclusionary rule that
rejected evidence of comparable sales in eminent domain
proceedings. °6 When facing difficulties in valuing unique
lands, courts which relied on the rule resorted to conceptually difficult valuation methods such as attempting to base
compensation on a landowner's right to exclude others from
the use and enjoyment of the land.07
The valuation problems associated with the literal application of the land-is-unique principle on the one hand,
and respect for the sovereign's eminent domain power on
the other, eventually resulted in an approach to valuation
that balances the two concerns:
Any tract of land is considered unique, and consequently it is in
cases of land valuation, and especially in condemnation cases, that
the question of admissibility of evidence of prices paid on other
sales is most frequently discussed.... [T]he view of the majority of
courts which admits such evidence, within safeguarding limits,
seems preferable ....

108

The "safeguarding limits" typically require comparable
sales to be recent and in a nearby location. They should also
involve properties that are used in a similar manner and

and arises as the direct and immediate result of the taking of a portion of the
lands by the condemning authority." Tolland Enter. v. Comm'r of Transp., 647
A.2d 1045, 1049 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994). Severance damages can be offset by
peculiar benefits enjoyed by the remaining property. See Cont'l Dev. Corp., 941
P.2d at 815-16.
105. See, e.g., Klick, 342 A.2d at 800; Mackie v. Snell, 154 N.W.2d 631, 638
(Mich. Ct. App. 1968); Vaughan, 470 P.2d at 973.
106. See Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 756-57 (1948) (ultimately
rejecting the rule and noting that it represented a highly criticized minority
position).
107. See In re Reservation at Niagara, 16 Abb. N. Cas. 159, 1884 WL 10832
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884) (dealing with valuation of unique land located near the
Falls).
108. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 312 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1957) (quoting
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §

166 (1954)).
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that have similar characteristics and improvements. 01 9 Comparable sales, chosen with these safeguards in mind, are
admissible to aid in the determination of market value. 110
However, respect for the uniqueness of every parcel of land
allows a landowner to present evidence of the condemned
land's characteristics that make it different from other
parcels in ways that affect its market value."'
This compromised valuation approach is not perfect.
Because market values often fail to take into account a
landowner's subjective valuation of the land, there is no
incentive for the government to avoid taking uniquely valued property. 112 Further, the comparable sales valuation
method fails to take into consideration the amount a landowner would be willing to pay to avoid condemnation, an
amount that would incorporate the transaction, moving,
and psychic costs of the taking."3 Despite their appeal, the
subjective valuation and willingness to pay approaches suffer from their own problems, notably quantification difficulties, making market valuation a preferable approach to
valuation."'

The prevalent use of comparable sales in condemnation
cases in no way diminishes the likelihood of valuation
disputes. Appraisers relying on comparable sales must select sales that are "as nearly comparable as possible and
adjust [their] estimate[s] of value of the subject property accordingly."" 5 Courts often point out that, because land is
unique, comparable sales are no more than tools that experts use to arrive at valuation. Consequently, they are
subject to interpretation and adjustment."6 The need for
109. Id. Other courts have relied on the McCormick treatise text as well. See
Bagdasarian, 31 Cal. 2d at 757 (relying on virtually identical language from
MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES 177 (1935)).
110. See Mackie, 154 N.W.2d at 638.
111. See, e.g., Miss. State Highway Comm'n v. Taylor, 293 So. 2d 9, 10
(Miss. 1974) (affirming jury condemnation award that took into consideration
unique location of land).
112. See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings:
An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 n.148 (1984).
113. Id. at 620.
114. Id.
115. State Highway Comm'n v. Vaughan, 470 P.2d 967, 973 (Mont. 1970).
116. See Butte Country Club v. Metro. Sanitary & Storm Sewer Dist., 519
P.2d 408, 411 (Mont. 1974); Consumers Power Co. v. Allegan State Bank, 174
N.W.2d 578, 591-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); J.R. Widmer, Inc. v. Dep't of
Revenue, 4 Or. Tax 361, 369 (Or. T.C. 1971) (involving tax assessment).
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flexibility in determining just compensation is particularly
keen today, when there are more ways than ever to consider
land unique:
Although [the land is unique] rule was created at common law, the
very factors giving it vitality in the simple days of its genesis take
on added significance in this modern era of development. Simply
stated, there are now more characteristics117 and criteria by which
other.
each piece of land differs from every

This reality dictates that, while market value is the
standard measure in eminent domain cases, courts will resort to other methods of valuation when the oddities of a
parcel of land make it particularly difficult to value."8
The market approach to valuation is both limited and
liberal, as evidenced by the safeguards that restrict the
choice of comparable sales and the allowance of evidence
pertaining to the unique characteristics of the land taken.
The flexibility of the valuation rules give appraisers much
leeway in calculating land values in condemnation cases.
Not surprisingly, challenges to the selection of comparable
sales and arguments regarding unique characteristics of the
condemned land form the basis of the vast majority of issues in the case law. A reading of any number of these cases
reveals that the resolution of these issues is highly casespecific."'
117. City of Los Angeles v. Waller, 90 Cal. App. 3d 766, 775 (Ct. App. 1979).
118. See Capital Props., Inc. v. State, 636 A.2d 319, 322 (R.I. 1994)
(resorting to before and after valuation of condemned land that it found to be
both unique and special purpose).
119. See, e.g., Mackie v. Snell, 154 N.W.2d 631, 636-37 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968)
(allowing evidence of sales of property in a different county where the sales involved property located near the condemnee's land and near the county border);
In re Mountain Lakes in Westchester, Inc., 219 N.Y.S.2d 140, 145-46 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1961) (rejecting an owner's comparable sales based on a highest and best
use of his land as a subdivision, in favor of sales reflecting highest and best use
for recreational purposes); City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460,
475 (Ct. App. 1935) (holding relevant environmental degradation to nearby land
and lake in calculating damages in a case involving the acquisition of littoral
rights); City of Springfield v. Beals Indus., Inc., 155 N.E.2d 501, 506-07 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1958) (reversing and remanding judgment when jury failed to consider
the high quality of gravel on condemned land in a condemnation case); Kamo
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Cushard, 455 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Mo. 1970) (holding relevant
the peculiar impact of unsightly power lines over a farm considered nicer than
those in the immediate area in determining the land's value); Metzner v. State,
59 Misc. 2d 603, 614 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1968) (holding comparable sales involving

lands in the area that did not share the unique location of the condemned land
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The objective in every eminent domain case is to allow
the public to benefit from the condemnation of private land
while making the landowner-condemnee whole. Land's favored status is not sufficient to defeat the exercise of eminent domain, because the good of the community prevails
over an individual landowner's loss; 120 nevertheless, the notion that each parcel of land is unique allows a landowner
to maximize his condemnation award to make it reflect
what has been lost. This valuation approach allows the government to go about its business while injecting certainty
into damage calculation.121
In every condemnation case, a landowner loses the
opportunity to use and enjoy land for shelter, investment,
recreation, or other purposes. As is true of specific performance cases, land's uniqueness is relevant in eminent domain
cases as a means of protecting the various expectation interests that titleholders enjoy. In eminent domain cases,
however, courts initially tend to favor the interests of government in acquiring land over a landowner's interests by
allowing the land to be compared to other property in order
to arrive at just compensation. Yet courts will respect the
land's uniqueness if needed to adjust valuation. Throughout
this back and forth reasoning, courts both reject and rely on
the land-is-unique principle, often without discussing the
relevant interests of the government and landowners.
Instead of explaining that the market value approach is viable due to public interests that outweigh those of private
landowners, or that comparable sales figures must be adjusted to account for a condemnee's unique land-related interests, courts pit the interests of the sovereign against
land and its uniqueness. In reality, however, what is balanced against the public interest is all of the interests in
title to land that the condemnee has lost. In response to the
question, "What's land got to do with eminent domain proceedings?," one might say that land is the subject of the
suitable only as reflective of the sharp increase in market value of lands in the
area); State v. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp., 577 S.W.2d 925, 930 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (allowing recovery when the special adaptation of a landowner's land
as a retail establishment frequented by the elderly resulted in spatter damages
caused by splashing water and snow coming from a newly expanded highway).
120. See HORWITZ, supra note 79, at 73.
121. Id. at 82. Since the nineteenth century the power of eminent domain
has been used to redistribute property and further economic development. Id. at
63.
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activity, but it is the competing land-related interests of the
public and individual landowners that dominate the case
law.
II. RHETORIC, OMISSION, AND COMPROMISE
The foregoing review of the specific performance, variance, and eminent domain case law sheds an interesting
light upon the land-is-unique principle. The fact that land's
uniqueness is a presumption in one situation, a strict requirement in another, and something to be secondarily considered in yet another is puzzling. Hypothetically, the same
land would be treated differently in each case. Is it possible
that the unique qualities of a parcel of land vary, depending
on the legal action involved? The answer, of course, is no,
but the language of the law seems to suggest the opposite.
There is no mystery behind the law's seeming contradictions in its handling of land's uniqueness in these types
of cases. The law favors the land in each scenario, but the
benefits flowing from that favored status and the landrelated interests that dominate shift between private and
public players. The weakness of the specific performance,
variance, and eminent domain cases is not that they are inconsistent, but rather that they appear to be inconsistent by
failing to adequately acknowledge this adjustment.
In specific performance cases, for example, the interests
and policies the law embraces are aligned with the buyer.
The protection of a buyer's expectation interests and the encouragement of land sales to those who highly value particular property are key.'22 The seller's interests are weak in
comparison. Sellers typically have little to lose if their sales
are consummated,'23 since they will receive the purchase
money and are protected by various24legal remedies if other
problems arise with the transaction.'

122. The free alienation of land has been a policy of American law for two
centuries. See id. at 3.
123. But see generally Berkovich, supra note 25 (arguing that expectation
damages are more effective than specific performance because they promote the
maximization of social welfare).
124. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hopkins, 834 So. 2d 695 (Miss. 2003) (holding
liquidated damage clause in real estate sales contract entitled sellers to retain
buyer's earnest money upon buyer's breach). In appropriate cases a seller may
also obtain punitive damages and attorneys' fees. See Sentinel Indus.
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Despite the persistent use of the "land is unique" principle to explain the near-automatic award of specific performance in land sales disputes, the cases in fact are not
about the unique characteristics of the land. The property
involved could contain natural landscaping making it truly
unique from neighboring lands; however, the fact that a
buyer plans to bulldoze the natural landscaping and destroy
its unique character will not prevent the buyer from
obtaining specific performance. Instead, equitable relief will
be granted to protect what the land means to the buyer and
to promote policies that encourage marketability and the
productive use of land. The failure of courts to make this
clear, and their rhetorical use of land's uniqueness in place
of a more satisfying analysis, is not only unhelpful, but lays
the groundwork for confusion.
In a way, variance cases are the antithesis of specific
performance cases. Without any explanation, the presumption of uniqueness vanishes, replaced instead by a strict
and virtually universal requirement of proof. This is curious, given that owners who seek variances often want to realize some of the same expectations regarding their property that would have entitled them to specific performance
had there been a dispute involving their purchase of the
land. The difference in variance cases is that the interests
of the opposition are no longer correspondingly weak.
Instead, the local zoning boards that make variance decisions are concerned with planning and implementing the
orderly development of land within their communities. They
are charged with carrying out an exercise of the police
power for the public good. If land was presumed to be
unique, any landowner could obtain a variance, making
land use planning impossible. In this situation, policies that
recognize the benefits of zoning and that protect the integrity of local land use plans outweigh the interests of landowners who seek to use land in unauthorized ways, except
in cases where the literal application of a zoning restriction
is confiscatory.
In variance cases, the dominant interests and policies
are those of the community, not those of landowners. As a
result, the land's uniqueness and unnecessary hardship
become elements of proof for the landowner. Arguably,
Contracting Corp. v. Kimmins Indus. Serv. Corp., 743 So. 2d 954, 971 (Miss.
1999).
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variance cases are no more concerned with exempting
unique lands from the application of zoning ordinances than
specific performance cases are concerned with protecting
unique lands. Instead, what matters is the orderly development of land and the prevention of regulatory takings.
This significant shift in emphasis from a private landowner's expectations toward public goals aimed at sensible
land use explains the different treatment of land's uniqueness in specific performance and variance cases. In variance
cases, the law no longer relies on the land-is-unique motto
as a surrogate for owner expectations; instead, all land
within a zoning district is considered to be very much the
same, and it is the local zoning board that enjoys the presumption.125 Land is still favored, but rather than being
favored in the hands of a prospective purchaser, it is favored for the benefit of the local government. The land may
create unique owner expectations, but it also creates unique
planning and development opportunities for the community
in the exercise of its police powers. Further, those community expectations weigh heavily in the balance. The land
becomes marginally relevant on an individual level only
when regulatory abuse is likely, and it is incumbent on the
landowner to prove it. Although the dueling interests of
community and private landowners are addressed in some
cases,126 there is virtually no acknowledgement of, or discussion about, the total retreat from the presumption of land's
uniqueness.
The disappearance of the presumption in variance case
law does not mean that land's favored status vanishes as
well. Variance law still favors the land in the sense that it
is a special asset, but the benefits arising from that favored
status shift from private landowners toward the community. Unfortunately, the relegation of land's uniqueness
from powerful presumptive rhetorical device to an element
of proof, absent any discussion that meaningfully addresses
the worthiness of the interests at issue, adds to the uncertainty surrounding the law's treatment of land.
The eminent domain case law presents yet another
example of how the law fails to fully explain its handling of

125. See Arndorfer v. Sauk County Bd. of Adjustment, 469 N.W.2d 831, 833
(Wis. 1991) (noting that there is a "presumption of correctness" to zoning board
determinations).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.

416

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

land's favored status. The presumption of land's uniqueness
resurfaces, but only after the law treats land as a commodity; and even though land is eventually recognized as
unique, proof of uniqueness is still required. This third
permutation of the land-is-unique principle combines the
approaches seen in the specific performance and variance
cases, and again raises a number of questions. How can the
law state that land is fungible and unique in essentially the
same breath? Why is the presumption afforded less weight?
If the presumption applies, why must there be proof of the
land's uniqueness? The answer to each question once again
lies in the alignment of public and private interests and
policies. In condemnation cases, like variance disputes, the
public interest carries significant weight. Unlike variance
cases, however, where community interests in land use
planning dominate, eminent domain cases involve public
and private interests that are more evenly balanced.
The government's power of eminent domain, under the
federal and state constitutions is unquestioned. Once it is
established that land is taken for a public purpose, there
can be little debate that the public interest in compensating
a landowner for the land is significant. The condemnee's
interest in receiving just compensation for the involuntary
loss of land is also significant. When confronted with these
powerful, competing interests, courts tend to reject the presumption of land's uniqueness in valuation determinations,
treating land as a commodity in order to make valuation
possible." 7
This first step in eminent domain cases is much like
that in variance cases, in which the interests of government
and community outweigh those of landowners. However,
the second step in compensation cases accepts land's
uniqueness in order to ensure that a landowner is made
whole. This second step, which strives to assess the highest
and best use of the land while taking into account special
characteristics of the land, is reminiscent of the specific performance cases, because it respects the land-related interests of the private landowner. But instead of explaining the
shifting importance of the public and private land-related
interests and policies, eminent domain cases present a confusing denial-then-affirmance of the land-is-unique princi-

127. See supra text accompanying notes 107-109.
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ple, adding to the confusion surrounding land's favored
status.
When considering these three types of cases together,
the analytical weakness is arguably the failure to acknowledge that land can be favored as a community asset as well
as a private one. In specific performance cases-where the
presumption of land's uniqueness holds sway-courts typically cling to the presumption without explaining that the
buyer's interests regarding the land and policies that
encourage real estate sales are what lead to land's favored
status for private landowners. In variance cases, where the
presumption of land's uniqueness disappears, courts rely on
the importance of the police power and the right of local
governments to zone, but fail to articulate that the government's police powers, specifically the government's interest
in orderly land use, dominate the interests of a landowner
except in cases where individual constitutional rights are
threatened. And in condemnation cases, where the presumption is at first suppressed and then resurrected, courts
emphasize the importance of the power of eminent domain
and the requirement of just compensation, but avoid
explaining that valuation decisions present situations
where the interests and policies involving the land are
fairly evenly balanced between the private and public
spheres.
Should we be concerned about the law's failure to
adequately explain the ebb and flow of land's favored status
and the resulting confusion? There are a number of arguments in the affirmative. First, few would disagree that
clarity in the law is something to be encouraged.' In addition, land and its ownership currently means more things to
more people than in previous generations. For example, the
public interest has expanded to embrace the protection of
128. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 266
(D.D.C. 2003) (noting the "strong public interest in election law clarity and
stability"); United States v. Tomasi, 313 F.3d 653, 662 (2d Cir. 2002)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that "clarity in the law is always to be desired," but cautioning judges to avoid deciding issues not before them); Cal.
Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Bonta, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823, 829 (Ct.
App. 2003) (noting the review of California regulations by the state's Office of
Administrative Law for clarity); State v. Herman, 70 P.3d 738 (Mont. 2003)
(Gray, J., concurring) (recognizing a lack of clarity in the law and criticizing
dicta that would augment the existing confusion); State v. Anderson, 575 S.E.2d
371, 377 (W. Va. 2002) (noting the importance of clarity in criminal law)
(Albright, J., concurring).
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the nation's most precious lands, 29 while at the same time
access to sunlight as a power source is now within the
realm of private property interests the law will protect.3 ' A
clear discussion of who should enjoy land's favored status is
thus vitally important.
A final argument in favor of a new land language is
perhaps the most important: an increasing number of laws,
along with theories that are slowly gaining acceptance, recognize the fact that land is unique in and of itself. To the
majority, these laws and theories demonstrate that legally
cognizable community interests in land are on the rise. 'To
others, they represent a new perception of land's favored
status, one that recognizes that land should be favored for
the benefit of the land itself.3 2 Regardless of one's point of
view, the myriad of laws touching on the land demand a
more complete discussion of whose land-related interests
are to be favored and why. If the law is to retain the idea
that land differs from personal property and should be
favored, it is incumbent upon lawmakers to consider and
more fully address the land-related interests at issue instead of resorting to an imprecise catch-phrase.
Thus far, this article has employed three scenarios in
an attempt to reveal gaps and confusion in the law's handling of one of its most fundamental principles. It has also
examined the case law and offered one explanation for the
confusion, suggesting the need for an analytical approach
that focuses on land-related interests and policies. What
has yet to be offered are historical reasons that may account
for the vagueness as well as theories that support the inter129. President Clinton's unprecedented expansion of the nation's national
monument system for the benefit of the nation and future generations is one
example. See generally Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the
Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REV. 473 (2003) (describing President
Clinton's expansion of the national monument system by over 6 million acres).
130. See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982) (protecting
owner of a solar-heated residence from neighbor's obstruction of sunlight).
131. Statutes authorizing conservation easements for the public's benefit
are one example. See, e.g., Erin McDaniel, Property Law: The Uniform
Conservation Easements Act: An Attorney's Guide for the Oklahoma Landowner,
55 OKLA. L. REv. 341 (2002).

132. Consider, for example, the views of eco-feminist ethicists who advocate
moral choices that take into account the concerns of nature, in and of itself. See
generally VAL PLUMWOOD, FEMINISM AND THE MASTERY Of NATURE 182-85 (1993)
(Advocating the application of virtue-based concepts such as care, respect and
gratitude to environmental ethics).
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est-based analysis endorsed here. The next section addresses these matters.
III. THE RISE (AND FALL?) OF LAND'S FAVORED STATUS IN THE
LAW

The discussion above demonstrates that in different
legal settings land's uniqueness means different things and
carries different weight. In each situation previously
examined, land's favored legal status plays a role, but the
land-related interests and policies that matter shift between landowner and community. Almost always, this shift
has to be gleaned from what the courts do not say, since the
express language of the case law deals with land's uniqueness in contradictory ways. The resulting uncertainty in the
parameters of land's unique status as a legal determinant
begs further exploration. While it is helpful to offer an explanation for the apparently inconsistent case law, it is also
useful to attempt to explain why land appears to be less
important than the interests at stake in a particular case
and why public, as opposed to private, interests in land are
commonly recognized.
The history relevant to land's treatment in the law is
helpful in this regard, and it provides a number of relevant
insights. First, the law continues to pay lip service to rules
touting land's uniqueness in the hands of individual landowners despite the fact that land has hardly ever been the
basis of these rules. Second, the law of property has evolved
in ways that increasingly embrace community ideals, and at
the same time has retreated from a focus on the items of
ownership while moving toward an abstract, rights-based,
construct. Finally, the development of our nation's land culture has, in a number of respects, paralleled the law's
evolution. Although it is tempting to say that a historical
and theoretical analysis leads to the conclusion that land's
favored status is in decline or even a thing of the past, that
is not the case. Instead, the law's favoritism is now centered
on land-related interests rather than the land itself, and
community land-related interests have become increasingly
important.
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A. Land Has Little to Do with It
There is little doubt that land is a darling of AngloThroughout history, it has been distinAmerican law.
guished from personal property and afforded special treatment. 3 4 Land's exalted place is even recognized in the
Talmud, which mentions that land's uniqueness makes its
valuation impossible.' The purported reasons for the distinction between real and personal property are numerous.
The simplest reasons are empirical: land is immovable and
place-specific while personal property is movable and fungible.'36 Historical reasons are also well-documented. In
medieval England, land was the sole source of wealth.
Kings assured their own security by allocating lands to nobles they could trust, and the new landowners, in turn,
pledged loyalty to the crown.'37 To perpetuate this system
for the reciprocal benefit of the king and landed nobility,
the feudal system was instituted and with it came common
law entailments, real writs, and the equitable rule that

133. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1143 (1964)
(mentioning land's favored status in the law and its importance throughout
legal history).
134. See Hanoch Dagan, RestitutionaryDamages for Breach of Contract:An
Exercise in Private Law Theory, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAw 115, 138 (2000);
Jeffry A. Frieden, Towards a Political Economy of Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 137 (2000).
135. See James Scheinman, Jewish Business Ethics, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L.
& POLY 63, 74 (1995). Early Germanic law similarly distinguished between real
and personal property. See THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 725-26 (5th ed. 1956).
136. See Steven Wilf, What is Property's Fourth Estate? Cultural Property
and the Fiduciary Ideal, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 177 (2001); see also John Edward
Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (stating that land is permanent, immovable, and
exhaustible). It has also been pointed out that land can be used in different
ways over time, providing yet another empirical distinction between real and
personal property. See David A. Johnson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:
Construction of Restrictive Covenants After the Implementation of Section
202.003 of the Texas PropertyCode, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 355, 386 (2001).
137. See Fred Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility,
Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439, 1449-51 (1994). See Steven Wilf, supra note
136, at 177, for a concurring view that feudalism established the differing
treatment of land and chattels. Land was the primary source of wealth until the
Industrial Revolution led to the rise of the corporation. See H. Newcomb Morse,
Applying the Hohfeld System to ConstitutionalAnalysis, 9 WHITTIER L. REV.
639, 647 (1988).
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land is unique. 13' Land was thus a very special form of
wealth, but even in these early years of land ownership, the
rights and obligations associated with that ownership were
arguably more important than the land itself.'39
More recently, the divergent treatment of real and personal property has been tied to psychology and philosophy,1 4° suggesting an even more attenuated relationship
between land and what its ownership means. Land, as a
fixed asset, is seen as a component of one's identity, as a
"symbol of the self and as a resource closely linked to personal freedom, rank and power."' We develop close personal ties to our land, 4 1 which becomes part of our identity
and heritage. 143 Personal property does not convey this
power.
138. See Bosselman, supra note 137, at 1451. Another example of land's
special treatment was medieval law's ban on devising real property. See
PLUCKNETT, supra note 135 at 725. Roman law, on the other hand, treated land
and chattels similarly. See WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW
AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN LAW

299-300 (William W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc.

reprint 1989). In fact, a large number of modern legal systems reject any such
distinction. Id. at 303.
139. Arguably, there were some exceptions. One example is the old common
law view that a tenant's interest was in the land itself, rather than any buildings attached to it, which resulted in the harsh rule requiring tenants to
continue paying rent after fire destroyed the premises. See Albert M. Greenfeld
& Co. v. Kolea, 380 A.2d 758, 759 (Pa. 1976). One could nevertheless argue that
this rule in actuality focused on what the land meant to tenants, who for the
most part relied on the land for their livelihood.
140. See Michael Allan Wolf, Taking Regulatory Takings Personally: The
Perils of (Mis)reasoningby Analogy, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1355, 1361 (2000) (noting
the "physical, economic, ecological, psychological and philosophical aspects of
land-raw and developed").
141. Dagan, supra note 134, at 138.
142. See Loren A. Smith, The Morality of Regulation, 22 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POLy' REV. 507, 518 (1998). This type of personal attachment is
often seen in farming families, who hand farmland down from one generation to
the next. See Michael G. Karby, Lucas and Takings of Farm Lands:
Unfavorable Winds, 4 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 133, 161 (1994).
143. See Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural
Resources on Public Lands, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 414 (2002). The literature
offers other rationales for the distinction between land and chattels. It has been
argued that, unlike personal property, land offers the downtrodden a place of
retreat and a place to convene to improve the community. See Thomas W.
Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black
Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition
Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 N.w. U. L. REV. 505, 539 (2000). It has also
been pointed out that land is unique because it is connected to adjoining lands
in important ways. See Smith, supranote 142, at 518.
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The argument that land and personal property are
treated differently due to land's ability to influence identity
and culture is reflected in suggestions that both identity
and culture are perpetuated and at times even created by
the law. Distinguishing between these two types of property
thus becomes significant in ways we might not anticipate.
Sociologist Wendy Espeland makes this point in an article
in which she argues that the application of laws that involve land can create false identities:
Law, whether enacted by bureaucrats, judges, lawyers, or
litigants, creates categories that become imposed on and practiced
in the world. We should not be surprised that these categories
have consequences: whether as basic as dictating causal logic, as
implicit as defining which kind of person can have an interest, or
as inclusive as controlling how to convey value, the potential of
legally mediated categories
to mark difference,
shape
consciousness, and inform the actions of those who confront them
is a crucial form of power.'4

Elsewhere, Professor Espeland has reiterated that "law
[is] a mediating structure that can potentially transform
the identities and interests of the groups it brings together."145 Thus, land not only influences who we are, but
property law can be instrumental in developing that identity. It is this law-sanctioned landowner identity and the
interests associated with it, rather than the land, that lie
behind land's favored status.
In a related way, Professor Sandra Zellmer points out
that land's ties to culture are at least as important as its
146
economic significance. This argument also emphasizes the
idea that the law of real property often gravitates toward
the cultural meaning of land rather than the land itself.
Professor Zellmer traces the evolution of our cultural con144. Wendy Espeland, Legally Mediated Identity: The National
Environmental Policy Act and the BureaucraticConstruction of Interests, 28 L.

& Soc'y REV. 1149, 1176 (1994) (suggesting that the Bureau of Reclamation's
handling of its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act regarding a proposed dam created a false identity for the Yavapai tribe, which
lived in, and had close cultural and spiritual ties to the area to be affected).
145. Wendy Nelson Espeland, Symposium: Colonialism, Culture, and the
Law: Bureaucratsand Indians in a Contemporary Colonial Encounter, 26 LAw.
& SOC. INQUIRY 403, 431 (2001).
146. See Zellmer, supra note 143, at 414. In this article, Professor Zellmer

argues that the clash between American and Native American land cultures explains the lack of assimilation of native peoples in the United States.
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nection to the American landscape from colonial times,
when the wilderness was something to be subdued, to nineteenth century America's romance with the wilderness and
simultaneous exploitation of the land's abundance for economic gain.147 The law adjusted to this cultural shift in an
almost schizophrenic way, by protecting wilderness areas
while at the same time encouraging expansion, economic
development, and the American ideal of living off the
land.14
" The law, by reacting to the "social meaning of land,"
not only perpetuated American land culture, but paved the
way for its evolution." 9
These various insights lead to the conclusion that land
is unique because of what it means to us as individuals and
as a society. The ownership of real property changes status;
it imparts personhood; it gives rise to expectations; it
shapes our culture. Land is unique because once we own it,
it bestows special benefits upon us and defines us in ways
that personal property does not. Despite the pervasiveness
of legal language touting land's favored status and its
uniqueness, property scholarship repeatedly makes clear
that the law's traditional approach to land has little to do
with the land itself. Although land is admittedly a special
subject of the law, it is almost always less important than
the unique land-related policies that serve public and private interests that reflect our identity and culture.
B. From Individual to Community; From Res to Rights
The insights discussed above persuasively suggest that
our social relationship with the land and our land identity
are, in reality, what property law treats as unique, lending
support to the thesis that land is, at most, of secondary
importance in a number of situations that require the application of land law. A corollary thesis, that property law
at times favors community land-related interests over those
147. Id. at 418-24.
148. See id. at 420-24, 428. The laws establishing national parks were enacted in part because Americans saw them as a proxy for the type of built cultural antiquities that existed in Europe but were nonexistent in young America.
Id. at 419-21. Professor Zellmer notes that Native American cultures see land
differently; to them, the land is politically and spiritually significant, and they
believe they are connected to the land. See id. at 414, 431-33.
149. See also Dagan, supra note 134, at 138 (noting that personal land
ownership is at the "core of the social meaning of land" in Western cultures).
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of individual landowners, is supported by developments in
property law that reveal the growing importance of community values.
From its very beginnings, property law had to come to
terms with the ongoing struggle between a communal the150
ory of property and one centered on private ownership.
Arguably, this conflict has been long settled, evidenced by
the centuries-long domination of private property in western civilization. In Roman times, private property was well
established, 5' and by the 1300s private land ownership was
so pervasive in England that the common law courts dealt
almost exclusively with land tenure matters. 5 2 A few centu-

ries later, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke elevated private
property to a natural right. 5 3 Although the two agreed on

the origins of private property, Locke rejected Hobbes' idea
of the social contract, suggesting instead that private property resulted from "annexing" one's labor to things removed
from the state of nature.5 4 His labor theory had widespread
appeal, especially in the colonies,'55 and its influence continued well into the nineteenth century.5 6 During this period, land's importance was very much centered on private,
individual land ownership and the benefits it bestowed on
individuals and the developing nation. One's rights in land
were nearly absolute,.5 7 and concerns about distributive justice were largely ignored.' 5

150. See generally J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY

(1992). Kelly points out that this age-old struggle can be seen in the writings of
Plato, who wrote of a community of property which should be evenly allocated
among people, and Aristotle, who adopted a more pragmatic approach, believing
that common property was inefficient and that property should generally be
privately held. Id. at 35-37.
151. Id. at 76.
152. RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 131 (1999) (quoting ARTHUR R.
HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 107 (1966)).

153. See KELLY, supra note 150, at 212-30.
154. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, BOOK II, CH. V (c. 1690),
quoted in JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 16 (3d ed. 1993).
155. See KELLY, supra note 150, at 230-31. Kelly notes that, although
Locke's writings appear to ignore notions of distributive justice, Locke did write
that one should never acquire more private property than he or she could use.
Id. at 232.
156. Id. at 334.
157. See HORWITZ, supra note 79, at 31.
158. See PIPES, supra note 152, at 291-92; see also HORWITZ, supra note 79,
at 40-41 (discussing the impact of nineteenth century mill laws). Private land
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This view changed in the nineteenth century. Judges
began to act with the will of the people in mind seeing
themselves as "agents of the sovereign people."" 9 Chief
among the goals furthered during this era was economic
growth, especially in cases involving land. 6 ° Courts increasingly focused on public policy and social advancement,
Baland dealt with precedent in a more fluid manner.'
ancing tests, which took into account community interests,
began to surface. 62 It was not unusual for courts to look
behind the form of disputes to their substance. As Morton
Horwitz noted, "[o]nce the actual understanding and purpose of the parties to the transaction were identified. . . the
legal system [provided] the mechanism for enabling individuals to accomplish their own desires." 63
The strong private property rights era of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had begun to unravel, and
as it did, community interests gained in importance. The
trend continued through the Industrial Revolution.
Mounting concerns about the accumulation of enormous
amounts of wealth by a handful of individuals, and a reemerging belief that the earth's riches should be shared by
all, challenged the dominant private property paradigm.'4
Anarchists, led by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, favored individual possession of property rather than individual ownership; Marxists sought the abolition of "bourgeois property,"
which they felt was founded on exploitation. ' These
attacks on private property did not, of course, gain widespread acceptance in America. Nevertheless, the early
twentieth century marked a period of increased concern
with social well being which was not lost on the law. Legal

ownership in fact operated as a check on "excessive" democracy, as the right to
vote was contingent on land ownership. See PIPES, supra note 152, at 232-33.
159. See HORWITZ, supra note 79, at 19-20.
160. Id. at 53. By the nineteenth century, property had become "an instrumental value in the service of the paramount goal of promoting economic
growth." Id. at 53. This stood in sharp contrast to the anti-development view of
land in the eighteenth century. Id. at 32.
161. Id. at 25.
162. Id. at 37. Horwitz uses nineteenth century mill law disputes to illustrate the courts' concern with community interests. Id. at 49-50.
163. Id. at 30.
164. See KELLY, supra note 150, at 335.
165. Id. at 336-37.
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realists argued that the law had lost touch with reality,16
and progressives suggested that social research could bring
the "disembodied" law back to earth. A more realistic legal
method, one more cognizant of social justice, was called
for.'67 Throughout the twentieth century, the law continued
to be shaped in ways that that reflected this growing social
and community awareness.'68
Newly articulated social concerns spawned public landrelated interests which, along with individual land-related
interests, became an important focus of property law. Although private property remains a stronghold in America, it
is increasingly re-defined by policies that further the goals
of the community.6 9 Variance cases, and to a lesser extent,
eminent domain valuation rules, which draw upon community policies and interests related to land, reflect this development.
A simultaneous and widely acknowledged development
that further supports the suggestion of the land's remoteness from land law is property law's current focus on the
rights associated with title rather than things. The evolution of property law in ways that incorporated social and
community policies, as discussed above, was "crucial in
dethroning landed property from the supreme position it
had occupied in the eighteenth century world view, and
ultimately, in transforming real estate into just another
cash-valued commodity." ' As this occurred, property law
became more rights-oriented. 7 '
This dramatic transformation began in the nineteenth
century. By the end of the Civil War, new forms of property
166. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960, 187 (1992).
167. Id. at 189.
168. The phenomenal growth in civil rights, land use, and environmental
regulation in the twentieth century are examples of this development.
169. See HORWITZ supra note 166, at 187. This move from absolute ownership to ownership qualified by community desires continues. The growing influence of ecological protection and concern for the land itself in environmental
and land use law are two examples. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Land
Made (Too) Simple, 33 ELR 10155, 10160-61 (2003); Robert J. Goldstein, Green
Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into
Real PropertyLaw, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347 (1998).
170. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 47-48 (referring specifically to the impact of
colonial mill acts).
171. See KELLY, supra note 150, at 425-26 (noting the move away from natural law theory to a rights-centered approach in late twentieth century America).
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interests were emerging. At the time, the dominant view of
property was "physicalist," tied closely to land and tangible
items. 7 The physicalist view, an awkward fit with these
new forms of ownership, slowly gave way to a more abstract
conception of property, which eventually came to mean the
exchange value of things rather than the things themselves."'
There were those who sought to refine property's newly
expanded boundaries. Among them was progressive scholar
Wesley Hohfeld, who deconstructed the abstract vision of
property and reconfigured it as a social creation. 74 He took
property to new limits, defining it as the abstract relations
between people, 17 which bestow rights that exist without
any relation to tangible items. 7 6 The bundle of rights metaphor, often attributed to Justice Cardozo, was a direct outgrowth of Hohfeld's work.'77 Its focus on abstract rights,
1930s,
duties, and relationships was well in place by the
78
and despite its critics it remains dominant today.
Property law's evolution into an abstract body of rules
that regulate rights rather than things, which increasingly
embrace community interests as well as individual ones,
seems to have occurred without a corresponding evolution
in the language of land law, where the "land is unique"
catch-phrase persists. This failure is especially perplexing
when one considers that American culture has come to
appreciate the social meaning of land more than the land
itself.

172. See HORWITZ, supra note 166, at 145.
173. Id. at 146. Eminent domain doctrine reflected this development by suggesting that any government act which affected the market value of land could
be a taking. Id. at 147.
174. Id. at 153-54.
175. Id. at 156.
176. See Goldstein, supra note 169, at 363-65.
177. Id. at 366-67.
178. Id. at 368-69 (Professor Goldstein ultimately argues that the bundle of
rights metaphor fails to take into account the land and related ecological
concerns.). It has recently been suggested that property law needs to be reconstituted in a way that looks beyond the tired bundle of rights metaphor to a
vision that acknowledges both interpersonal rights related to an object, as well
as the relationship between owners and the objects themselves. See Craig
Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property:Property as a Web of Interests,
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002).
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C. America's Land Culture
Property law's abstraction and its attention to community concerns is, perhaps not surprisingly, mirrored by
America's relationship with the land. Even in feudal times,
the ownership of land had little to with the land itself and
everything to do with the benefits land ownership bestowed
on the owner. Title to land conferred wealth, political
rights, and enhanced one's status and power.179 Further, the
prevalence of entailments and the availability of equitable
remedies assured families that they would retain their land
holdings for generations."' 0 In England, land ownership
assured a hereditary class. In America, however, it came to
mean something very different.
From the time the nation was founded, land ownership
was not only the dream of every American,' but was seen
as essential to democracy. 8 2 The acquisition of land promoted individual independence and opportunity; it protected self-determination, moral autonomy and independence."' America's rejection of the fee tail and widespread
use of the fee simple, which conferred ownership of an infinite duration, further distinguished the English and
American perceptions of land.' 8 By the time the Industrial
Revolution arrived in America all resources, including land,
were considered commodities. Land, still a source of wealth
and power, became something to be consumed, separate
from its users, especially those who would come to own and
use the land in the future.' Still, what mattered, and what
the law protected, were the rights arising from land ownership, rather than the land itself. In this way, property law's
rights-oriented focus mirrored America's detachment from
the land.
The ethical dimensions of America's relationship with
the land also reflect the rights-centered view of property.
179. See Smith, supra note 142, at 518.
180. See Bosselman, supra note 137, at 1453-54.
181. See id. at 1467-68.
182. Id. at 1468-69 (attributing this view to Thomas Jefferson).
183. See Joan L. McGregor, PropertyRights and Environmental Protection:
Is This Land Made for You and Me?, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 391, 421 (1999).
184. See Bosselman, supra note 137, at 1469-71.
185. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN A CONNECTED LAND, (noting
the fragmentation of America's cultural landscape and the lack of ethical obligations running to future owners) (forthcoming Environmental Law Institute
publication) (manuscript on file with author).
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Although land ownership connotes a number of ethical positions, the dominant ethic is arguably one of expectation and
opportunity. 8 ' The Jeffersonian ideal of land ownership, so
closely tied to self-sufficiency and personal liberty, remains
relevant.'87 Within this ethic, land is a special asset because
of the freedoms and opportunities associated with its ownership. Yet, because land is also considered a commodity,
the law easily acknowledges that it can be converted into
money in order to maximize human happiness. 8 Still,
America's vision of land ownership recognizes the age-old
distinction between personal and real property and is very
much centered on individual desires: "[P]roperty is simply
established expectations. People have expected a greater
degree of security in land than in personal property.... ,,"'
The land ethic of opportunity is deeply ingrained in American culture and comports well with property law's focus on
individual rights. We are a people who value and aspire to
land ownership. As landowners we have come to expect a
considerable amount of freedom in how we use and enjoy
the land, and we staunchly guard our rights and expectations as landowners.
America's land culture also incorporates communitycentered values that co-exist with the ethic of opportunity.
This component of our land culture, which includes an ethic
of responsibility, is embodied by a number of property laws
that are sympathetic to public land-related interests. The
idea that Americans must act responsibly toward the
nation's natural resources, so forcefully argued by John
Muir and others, 9 ° has a strong presence in American society. As a people, we value the vistas that define our country
and at the same time accept restrictions on the use of land.
186. See generally Bosselman, supra note 137. Professor Bosselman argues
that it is futile to believe America will embrace one land ethic and suggests that
four land ethics will continue to play a role. They are the ethics of order, reform,
responsibility, and opportunity. Id. at 1440-41.
187. Id. at 1494 (arguing that this ideal played a role in Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
188. Id. at 1496-1500 (discussing the views of Justice Scalia, noting he is a
staunch adherent of the opportunity-based land ethic).
189. Id. at 1493-94. The ongoing debate regarding oil drilling in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge implicates the conservation ethic. See, e.g., Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) (adapted from a report by M. Lynne Corn &
Pamela Baldwin) (2002), at www.policyalmanac.org/environmentlarchive/crs_
anwr.shtml.
190. See Bosselman, supra note 137, at 1476-85.
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We have become comfortable with the limitations imposed
by zoning, environmental and nuisance laws. The combination of the land ethics of responsibility and opportunity in
conjunction with a strong sense of land rights creates a
sophisticated American land culture that balances personal
and community land-related interests, and that is far removed from a singular focus on the land itself.
Determining whether property law created America's
land culture or whether the law grew to reflect America's
changing relationship with the land is not crucial to the
thesis presented in this article. What is significant is that
these legal and cultural forces inform our nation's land law.
In particular, the law's increasing recognition of community
interests explains the private-public shift in policies targeting land that are reflected in the types of cases discussed
here. These developments are seen in the demanding
requirements of variance law and in eminent domain's allowance of comparable sales to arrive at just compensation.
At the same time, the law's increasing abstraction explains
the focus on landowner interests in specific performance
cases and in eminent domain valuation principles. In all of
these situations, land remains significant, but it is no
longer favored in and of itself or merely as a source of power
and status. Despite the omnipresence of the "land is
unique" language, what the law targets are landowner
rights and expectations related to the land, and when appropriate, it turns to community-centered values, including
those of responsibility.191
CONCLUSION

As land-related rights have come to dominate property
law and as land ownership has become increasingly modified by community concerns, courts oddly continue to cling
to the fiction that land's uniqueness matters. Yet it is clear
that the law sees land as unique only insofar as land ownership differs from the ownership of personal property. In
reality, what the law embraces are the land-related rights
and interests of private landowners and the community on
a fluctuating basis. It is also apparent that our society
thinks of land ownership in much the same way.
191. See id. at 1476-85. To a lesser extent, Professor Bosselman argues that
Americans share a land ethic of reform. Id. at 1457-76.
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There is little doubt that the laws implicating landrelated interests are increasing in number and in complexity. Smart growth restrictions, 9 2 sustainable development
initiatives, 9 and ecosystem management directives 1 are
just a few of the laws with which land owners must grapple.
At the same time, property rights initiatives and economic
development efforts remain strong. 9 ' As we confront conflicts within an increasing number of scenarios where public and private land-related interests compete, we would do
well to avoid rhetorical and unhelpful reliance on the "land
is unique" principle.
This article has attempted to expose inconsistencies associated with land's favored legal status as embodied by the
land-is-unique principle, to reveal both the interests and
analytical dynamics that underlie the case law, and to establish the need for a new land language that meaningfully
explains how, and for whom, land's unique status matters.
To borrow from Emerson's quote at this article's outset,
"land is unique" is an "old well-known air," which the law
"hums... through innumerable variations." Many of those
variations have become little more than monotonous and
unsatisfying cliches. Perhaps it is time for the law to
change its tune.
T

192. See, e.g., James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and
Diversity: Progressive Planning Movements in America and Their Impact on
Poor and Minority Ethnic Populations,21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 45 (200203).
193. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, SustainableDevelopment and Air Quality:
The Need to Replace Basic Technologies with Cleaner Alternatives, 10 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 25 (2003).
194. See, e.g., John C. Tucker, Biodiversity Conservation and Ecosystem
Management in Florida: Obstacles and Opportunities, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
1 (2001).
195. As to property rights efforts, see Robert Meltz, Property Rights
Legislation: Analysis and Update, in ALI-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
COURSE OF STUDY, SB14 ALI-ABA 551 (1996) (detailing numerous state and
federal property rights legislative initiatives). For a discussion of community
development activities, see Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic
Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for
Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001) (mentioning the proliferation of
community economic development initiatives in the 1990s).

